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I. INTRODUCfiON 
Most judicial discussions of affirmative action and racial jus-
tice are unsatisfying because they omit a fundamental category 
of evidence: Information which would provide a basis for evalu-
ating the scope of Jim Crow and its systematic consequences. 
Some assessment of the entirety of the institution is necessary to 
have an informed view of whether Jim Crow has been elimi-
nated. While there is much scholarship, legislative history and 
jurisprudence about particular issues such as school segregation 
or racial disenfranchisement, especially at specific times and 
places, there is apparently no source which makes it possible to 
analyze the scope of racial discrimination through law and cus-
tom over time on a national level. There is no source, for exam-
ple, identifying all of the school systems in the United States that 
were segregated by law or custom, no reference listing even the 
largest governmental agencies and corporations known to have 
practiced formal racial discrimination in employment. 
The absence of systematic factual information and the con-
sequent necessity of over-reliance on intuition are significant be-
cause the Supreme Court and its justices often explore the ques-
tion of whether it is time to declare that they have put America's 
race problem behind them. In exploring these questions, the jus-
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tices seem to believe that a level playing field is both important 
and legally significant. 
In Grutter v. Bollinger,1 a majority of the Court concluded 
that the promised land had not yet been reached. The majority 
approved an affirmative action program at the University of 
Michigan Law School; in a series of opinions, every member of 
the Court addressed the question of when affirmative action 
would be unnecessary. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the ma-
jority noted that: 
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the 
use of race to further an interest in student body diversity in 
the context of public higher education. Since that time, the 
number of minority applicants with high grades and test 
scores has indeed increased .... We expect that 25 years from 
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary 
to further the interest approved today? 
Whatever the actual underlying rationale for this forecast, 3 the 
Court's prediction rests on the idea that within 25 years, a suffi-
ciently racially diverse student body will be achieved through 
ordinary sorting and application processes. When that happens, 
the decades of debate about the permissibility of affirmative ac-
tion and the rationales for it will become moot; affirmative ac-
tion will not be justified as a means of remedying past discrimi-
nation, because it will have been remedied, and it will not be 
justified as a means of achieving diversity because diversity will 
result automatically, just as it does, for example, with respect to 
Asian Americans, Italian Americans, and those of the Jewish 
faith. 
Although the perspectives of the concurring and dissenting 
opinions were quite different, they shared with the majority the 
explicit or implicit premises that race-neutrality is desirable, that 
the nation is moving towards racial fairness and that judges can 
I. 53Y U.S. 306 (2003). 
2. !d. at 343 (citation omitted). 
3. As Dean Kevin Johnson cogently observed, the timetable is surprising in the 
context of a decision upholding diversity as a compelling state interest. "If a diverse stu-
dent body is the justification for affirmative action, it is uncertain why the law would re-
quire a time limit." Kevin Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action? 21 
CONST. COMMENT. 150 (2004). That is, there is no reason to assume that diversity will 
not be as desirable in a century or millennium as it is now. If diversity is the true ration-
ale for the Court's decision, then the time limit does not at first blush make an enormous 
amount of sense, and Dean Johnson is right that the Court's language contains the possi-
bility of sympathy to the idea that the real justification for the program, and a legitimate 
one. is remedying past discrimination. 
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tell when (or that) the nation has achieved equal opportunity. 
Justice Thomas's dissent quoted Frederick Douglas, who argued 
for nothing more or less than equitable treatment: "'What I ask 
for the negro is not benevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but 
simply justice."'4 
Justice Ginsburg argued that the legacy of past discrimina-
tion was too weighty either to declare victory now, or even toes-
tablish any particular time limit: 
As lower school education in minority communities improves, 
an increase [in minority students with high grades and test 
scores] may be anticipated. From today's vantage point, one 
may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next genera-
tion's span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely 
equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative ac-
tion.5 
The opinions rest on the core value of equal opportunity, which 
seems to be the "justice" desired by Justice Thomas, as well as 
the engine of the increased grades and test scores predicted in 
Justice O'Connor's opinion, and hoped for in Justice Ginsburg's. 
Judicial evaluation of the development of African Ameri-
cans in the context of the larger society is part of a long judicial 
tradition. In 1883, in the Civil Rights Cases,6 the Court held that 
the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to state action, and 
thus that Congress had no power to prohibit private discrimina-
tion. They were also exasperated with undue congressional con-
cern for special rights for African American: 
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of be-
neficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomi-
tants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of 
his elevation when he takes the rank of mere citizen, and 
ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his 
rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected by the ordi-
nary modes by which other men's rights are protected. 7 
4. !d. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Frederick Douglass, 
What the Black Man Wants: An Address Delivered in Boston, Massachusetts, on 26 
January 1865, reprinted in 4 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 59, 68 (J. Blassingame 
& J. McKivigan eds., 1991)) (emphasis in original). 
5. !d. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
6. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
7. !d. at 25. Justice Harlan proposed that it was "scarcely just to say that the col-
ored race has been the special favorite of the laws." !d. at61 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke8 Justice 
Blackmun voted for affirmative action with simultaneous convic-
tion and regret: 
I yield to no one in my earnest hope that the time will come 
when an "affirmative action" program is unnecessary and is, 
in truth, only a relic of the past. I would hope that we could 
reach this stage within a decade at the most. But the story of 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), decided 
almost a guarter of a century ago, suggests that that hope is a 
slim one.9 
Again, although the conclusions differed, a century apart, both 
opinions reflected confidence that the "stage" of African Ameri-
can progress could be reliably determined. However, they sup-
port their conclusions primarily with judicial decisions, which, 
even if not quite random, cannot be assembled to create an accu-
rate picture of the world. 
Judges could not base their decisions on systematic analyses 
of Jim Crow because there are no systematic analyses of Jim Crow. 
For example, we know there was segregation in the schools, but 
there is no single source identifying the school districts in this coun-
try practicing unconstitutional racial segregation and what hap-
pened in those school districts after Brown v. Board of Education. 
We know African Americans used to be excluded from all jobs or 
good jobs at some institutions, but there is no catalog of the major 
corporate and governmental employers who refused to hire Af-
rican Americans and when those policies ended. We know Afri-
can Americans and others used to be denied the right to pur-
chase property in particular areas through racially restrictive 
covenants in real estate documents, but there is no national cal-
culation of the prevalence of restrictive covenants and their ef-
fects on African American housing patterns and African Ameri-
can wealth creation. We know African Americans used to be 
denied the right to serve on juries in criminal and civil cases, but 
there is no estimate of the number of verdicts that might have 
been affected by this discrimination, or their economic and other 
consequences. We know that laws were passed to harm members 
of particular races, but there has been no effort to identify the 
laws still on the books designed to promote racial separation or 
deny African Americans equal opportunity. 
8. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
9. !d. at 403 (Btackmun, J.). 
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There are two major implications of the absence of this type 
of evidence. First, there has never been a formal national project 
to eliminate the structure and effects of racial discrimination the 
way there has been, for example, to eliminate polio or provide a 
national highway system. Such a project would be impossible 
without reliable information about the scope of racial discrimi-
nation. In the absence of a conscious, systematic effort to elimi-
nate the vestiges of past discrimination it is much less likely that 
it will happen. Second, there has been no calculation of the na-
tional effects of racial discrimination, how society at any point 
differs from how it would have looked in the absence of dis-
crimination. Again, such a calculation is impossible in the ab-
sence of systematic information about the scope of racial dis-
crimination. 
Part II of this essay examines one of the most heavily stud-
ied and litigated aspects of Jim Crow, the state legislative re-
sponse to Brown v. Board of Education, and shows that much of 
the statutory effort to evade Brown in the former Confederate 
states remains on the books, some of it in ways that could be 
used to discriminate on the basis of race now. 10 Part III explores 
some of the implications of the fact that large portions of the 
states' efforts to defy the Constitution remain on the books. 11 
The essay concludes by proposing a comprehensive study of ra-
cially discriminatory laws and policies in the United States in or-
der to make it possible for policymakers and the public to ana-
lyze the legacy of racial discrimination or lack thereof. 12 
II. JIM CROW LAWS ON THE BOOKS TODAY 
Perusal of the codes of laws 13 of the States of the Union 
shows that fifty years after Brown, Jim Crow has not gone away. 
Various Jim Crow measures, and in particular a significant frac-
tion of the statutes enacted to derail integration, remain in the 
statutes or constitutions of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Missis-
10. See notes 13-74, infra, and accompanying text. 
11. See notes 75-118, infra, and accompanying text. 
12. See notes 119-126, infra, and accompanying text. 
13. The information in this section is drawn from the report of the Jim Crow Study 
Group at the University of Arizona. See Still on the Books: Jim Crow and Segregation 
Laws Fifty Years After Brown v. Board of Education, 6 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. 
(forthcoming 2004). As this article was going to press, some of the statutes cited in this 
section were in the process of repeal as a result of the information presented in the re-
port. 
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sippi, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West 
Virginia. 14 
A. MASSIVE RESISTANCE TO INTEGRATION 
Brown v. Board of Education's declaration that segregation 
in public schools was unconstitutional stunned many white 
communities in states practicing racial segregation. 15 One tech-
niaue states used to avoid integration was simply to refuse to do 
it, 1 or even violently resist it. 17 This effort was supported by 
various kinds of state statutes. 
A significant example of this remains on the books in Lou-
isiana. Sub-Part G-2 of the Louisiana Statutes governing public 
schools is titled "OPERATION OF SEPARATE SCHOOLS 
FOR WHITE AND COLORED."18 Section 335 governs "Sala-
ries and emoluments of school officials during federal integra-
14. A number of sources explore various aspects of the southern legal response to 
Brown. See NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND 
POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950s (1969); THOMAS EMERSON, ET AL., 
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1252-99 (1967); HARRELL 
RODGERS & CHARLES BULLOCK, COERCION TO COMPLIANCE (1976); GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE 
(1991 ); Alexander M. Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and Pros-
pects, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 193 (1964); Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation: 
Desegregating the South During the Decade After Brown, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 92 (1994); 
Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, School Choice and the Lessons of Choctaw County, 
10 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (1992); Wendy Parker, The Future Of School Desegregation, 
94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157 (2000); Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE 
L.J. 1436 (1973) [hereinafter "Segregation Academies"]; Note, The Federal Courts and 
Integration of the Southern Schools: Troubled Status of the Pupil Placement Acts, 62 
COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (1962). 
\5. A statement suggesting the importance of racial segregation to some is con-
tained in a unanimous decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court affirming the convic-
tions of a group of freedom riders: 
Segregation in schools and in all means of public transportation has been 
declared at an end by judicial fiat. The cry by certain groups for conformity to 
their beliefs rings out endlessly over the land through the various media of 
communications. Large numbers of people, in this broad land, arc steeped in 
their customs, practices, mores and traditions. In many instances, their beliefs 
go as deep or deeper than religion itself. If, in the lapse of time, these principles, 
sacred to them, shall be disproved, then it may be accepted that truth will pre-
vail. But, until those principles have been tested in the crucible of time, no ab-
ject surrender should be expected, much less demanded. 
Knight v. State, 161 So. 2d 521,523 (Miss. 1964). 
16. See EMERSON, supra note 14, at 1264-68 (discussing violent resistance to Brown 
and legal doctrines of "nullification" and "interposition" used to justify non-compliance 
with federal constitutional principles deemed objectionable by particular states). 
17. For an excellent account of physical governmental resistance to federal court 
orders, sec WILLIAM DOYLE, AN AMERICAN INSURRECTION: JAMES MEREDITH AND 
THE BA TILE OF OXFORD, MISSISSIPPI (2001 ). 
18. LA. REV. STAT. T. 17, Ch. 1, Pt. III, Subpt. G-2. 
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tion action," and provides that salaries shall continue to be paid 
"during time necessarily spent by such person away from his 
normal duties as a consequence of federal action relatin._p to inte-
gration of the races in the public schools of Louisiana." 1 
Louisiana teachers would be paid not only when they were 
away from their duties to participate "in a proceeding before a 
federal court, board, commission or officer," but also when ab-
sence resulted because the teacher's support of segregated 
schools led to their being "imprisoned or confined pursuant to 
an order or judgment of a federal court."20 Thus, teachers could 
count on state support if held in contempt for disobeying federal 
injunctions or even if indicted, convicted and sentenced for 
criminal participation in violent resistance. 
B. CLOSING PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Another method of finessing Brown was to close the public 
schools?1 The statutes of Louisiana22 grant the governor the dis-
cretion to close the schools temporarily. If the governor invokes 
this authority, "and after a reasonable time determines that all 
the schools may not be reopened and operated on a racially se§-
regated basis, he may declare the schools permanently closed." 3 
This statute is in Louisiana's code even though it was declared 
unconstitutional over 40 years ago by a three judge U.S. District 
Court in a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court.24 Another 
statutory system providing for closing the schools following a 
referendum was only partially repealed even though it was held 
unconstitutional in 1961.25 The school closings of Arkansas26 and 
19. LA. REV. STAT.§ 17:335(a). 
20. /d. 
21. See EMERSON, supra note 14, at 1273-74 (discussing school closing as a means of 
resisting Brown); School Closing Plans, 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 807 (1958). 
22. LA. REV. STAT. § 17:171 (governor's authority to close schools); LA. REV. 
STAT. § 17:349.1-.5 (governor's authority to take over and temporarily or permanently 
close schools); see also LA. REV. STAT.§ 17:172 (prohibiting operation of school other 
thao: in accordance with state policy); LA. REV. STAT.§ 17:173 (denying promotion and 
graduation to any students attending class "where the class has been made subject to any 
order not consistent with the Constitution and laws of the state"); LA. REV. STAT. § 
17:429; LA. REV. STAT. § 17:430 (providing for revocation of teaching certificates for 
teaching a class "in violation of the Constitution or laws of this state"). 
23. LA. REV. STAT.§ 17:349.2(0). 
24. Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916, 930 (E.D. La. 1960) (three 
judge court) ("this court ... declares [inter alia] Act ... 12, 14, 23, 24 ... of the First Ex-
traordinary Session of 1960 unconstitutional. This court will prepare the decree enjoining 
their enforcement"), affd mem. per curiam, 365 U.S. 569 (1961). 
25. LA. REV. STAT.§§ 350.2-350.14 (held unconstitutional in Hall v. St. Helena Par-
ish Sch. Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961) (three judge court), affd mem. per curiam, 
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Virginia27 were also invalidated.28 Nevertheless, Georgia29 and 
Mississippi,30 like Louisiana, also still have laws on the books 
dating to the era of massive resistance authorizing the governor 
to close educational institutions. There is no apparent reason 
these statutes could not be used today. 
C. REPEALING COMPULSORY A TIENDANCE LAWS. 
Closing schools created difficulty because state law required 
school attendance of children of a certain age.32 Many segre-
gated states changed their laws to relax or eliminate this re-
quirement to facilitate school closing. In February, 1959, Gover-
nor Almond of Virginia gave a speech addressing his proposed 
responses to the "unholy alliance of a conspiracy to destroy the 
Constitution" represented by Brown;33 he noted that "no parent 
or guardian is under any legal compulsion from any source to 
send a child to a racially mixed school, "34 and as one of 11 ideas 
for preventing race-mixing proposed to "take a more thorough 
look at the statutes of our compulsory attendance laws."35 He 
closed his speech by reminding the legislature that he "pledged 
368 U.S. 515 (1962)). 
26. Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (three judge court) (per 
curiam), affd mem. per curiam sub nom. Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959). 
27. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). See R.C. SMITH, THEY CLOSED 
THEIR SCHOOLS: PRI:-ICE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1951-1964 (1965). 
28. But see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (allowing city to close recrea-
tional facilities based on claim that they could not be operated on profitably on an inte-
grated basis). 
29. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-3-70 (governor may close school when "continued opera-
tion of any such school or institution or any branch or department thereof is likely to re-
sult in or cause violence or public disorder in the community in which such school is situ-
ated or that it is necessary to preserve the good order, peace, and dignity of the state or 
any subdivision thereof "). Georgia successfully used this statute to delay integration; 
Judge Hooper refused to enforce his earlier desegregation order for fear that "such Or-
der of the Court could have no effect except to close the Atlanta schools and risk the 
danger of all of Georgia's schools being closed." Calhoun v. Latimer, 188 F. Supp. 412, 
413 (N.D. Ga. 1960). 
30. MISS. STAT. ANN.* 37-65-1 (governor may close schools when it is in "the best 
interest of a majority of the educable children of any public school district" or when 
"such closure will promote or preserve the public peace, order, or tranquility of such dis-
trict or districts"). 
32. Charles K. Woltz, Compulsory Attendance at School, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
3 (1955). 
33. Address of Governor J. Lindsay Almond Jr. to a Special Session of the Virginia 
General Assembly on January 28, 1959, reprimed in 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 183, 183 
(I 959). 
34. /d. at 186. 
35. /d. at 187. 
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to the people of Virginia that I would resist with every resource 
at my command that which I know to be wrong and would de-
stroy eve~ rational semblance of effective public education in 
Virginia." 6 
On March 31, 1959, the Commission on Education ap-
pointed by the Governor issued its report.37 As to Brown, they 
explained: "Never before had the court rendered a decision so 
drastically invading the right of the states to manage their inter-
nal affairs."38 One of the measures proposed was to provide that 
"any child may, with consent of his parent or guardian, be ex-
cused from school either on recommendation of school authori-
ties and the juvenile judge or on recommendation of the Super-
intendent of Public Instruction."39 It became law and remains on 
the books.40 This statute allowed the authorities to excuse white 
students from attending integrated schools, and to encourage 
African American students to opt out of school entirely. 
Georgia law also provides that the Governor may suspend 
compulsory education laws "over the entire state or in any por-
tion thereof" based on "any riot, insurrection, public disorder, 
disturbance of the peace, natural calamity, or disaster. "41 Thus, if 
a mob attacked African Americans attempting to enter a for-
merly all white school, it could be closed. 
D. FINANCIAL AID TO SEGREGATED "PRIVATE" SCHOOLS 
Closing schools for white children based on actual or at-
tempted integration would defeat integration, but at the cost of 
leaving those white children without educational opportunities. 
Accordingly, southern states closing public schools, or wishing to 
provide white citizens an alternative to integrated public schools, 
offered "massive financial aid to private segregated schools. "42 
One court explained that the laws created "a means by which 
36. /d. at 188. 
37. Education in Virginia: Report uf the Commission un Education (Mar. 31 1959), 
reprinted in 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 392 (1959). 
38. /d. at 392. 
39. /d. at 400. 
40. 1959 Va. Laws Ch. 72, § 4, codified as amended at VA. STAT.§ 22.1-254(C)(1) 
("A school board may excuse from allcndance at school: On recommendation of the 
principal and the division superintendent and with the wrillen consent of the parent or 
guardian, any pupil who the school board determines, in accordance with regulations of 
the Board of Education, cannot benefit from education at such school."). 
41. GA. CODE ANN.§ 20-2-702. 
42. Segregation Academies, supra note 14, at 1438; see also Wendy Parker, The 
Color of Choice: Race and Charter Schools, 75 TUL. L. REV. 563,568 & n.15 (2001). 
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public schools under desegregation orders may be changed to 
'private' schools operated in the same way, in the same build-
ings, with the same furnishings, with the same money, and under 
the same supervision as the public schools. "43 
The Supreme Court prohibited this assistance in various 
forms,44 but these decisions were neither self-enforcing nor so 
clear that they could not be evaded-perhaps the most telling 
feature of these decisions is that they unfolded over decades, so 
many years of support occurred before particular programs or 
forms of support were halted.45 Laws passed to support private 
schools remain on the books. The Virginia Supreme Court in-
validated Virginia's tuition grant program in 1955 because it vio-
lated the state constitutional prohibition on public support of 
private schools;46 the constitution was then amended to allow 
grants to private schools, and it continues to do so.47 South Caro-
lina retains its grant-in-aid statute in its current code, compiled 
in 1976,48 even though the state had been permanently enjoined 
from enforcing the statute in 1968 in a decision affirmed by the 
Supreme Court.49 
43. Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649,651 (E.D. La. 1961) (three 
judge court), affd mem. per curiam, 368 U.S. 515 (1962). 
44. See Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974) (invalidating program allow-
ing usc of recreational facilities by segregated private schools); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 
U.S. 455 (1973) (invalidating Mississippi text book loan program); Poindexter v. Louisi-
ana Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967) (three judge court) (in-
validating tuition grant program), affd mem per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968); Lee v. 
Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 475-78 (M.D. Ala.) (three judge court) 
(invalidating tuition grant program), affd mem per curiam sub nom. Wallace v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967); see also Griffin v. Bd. of Supervisors, 339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 
1964); Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969) (three 
judge court); Griffin v. Bd. of Educ., 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965) (three judge 
court). 
45. Compare Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding dis-
criminatory private secondary schools and universities arc not entitled to tax exempt 
status) with Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (individuals lack standing to challenge 
IRS non-enforcement of Bob Jones holding). 
46. Almond v. Day, 89 S.E.2d 851 (Va. 1955). 
47. See VA. CONST. ART. VIII, § 10 ("No appropriation of public funds shall be 
made to any school ... not owned or exclusively controlled by the State ... ; provided, 
first, that the General Assembly may, and the governing bodies of the several counties, 
cities and towns may ... , appropriate funds ... which may be expended in furtherance of 
elementary, secondary, collegiate or graduate education of Virginia students in public 
and nonsectarian private schools and institutions of learning, ... "). 
48. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-41-20 ("Subject to the terms and provisions of this 
chapter every school child in the State who has not yet finished or graduated from high 
school and who desires to attend a private school located within the State shall be eligible 
for and entitled to receive a State scholarship grant in an amount equal to the per pupil 
cost to the State of public education as certified by the Governor."). 
49. Brown v. South Carolina State Bd. of Ed., 296 F. Supp. 199 (D.S.C.) (three-
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In 1960, the Committee on Schools of the Georgia General 
Assembly recommended establishing a program of tuition grants 
"for the benefit of any child whose parent chooses to withdraw 
said child from an integrated school."50 The Georgia legislature 
followed this recommendation, passing a law, still in the Code, 
authorizing tuition payments to private schools.51 Georgia also 
authorizes lease of school property to private institutions.52 This 
law remains on the books, and in principle is entirely valid and 
enforceable, even though in several instances Georgia school 
districts were enjoined from selling public schools for use as pri-
vate, segregated schools.53 
After Brown, many states authorized private school teach-
ers to toin the pension program for public school teachers. Ar-
kansas 4 and Virginia55 repealed their statutes in the 1980s, but 
those of Alabama56 and Georgia57 remain in effect. 
judge court) (permanently enjoining section), affd mem. per curiam, 393 U.S. 222 (1968). 
50. Report of the Committee on Schools of the General Assembly of Georgia, re-
printed in 5 RACE REL. L. REP. 509,516 (1961). See also Board of Pub. Educ. for the City 
of Savannah and County of Chatham v. Georgia, 1992 WL 699499, *2 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 
1992) ("The repeal of these segregation laws did not signal the end of state resistance to 
desegregation efforts. In 1961, the General Assembly provided tuition grants for students 
who wished to attend private, segregated schools. Moreover, state officials offered to 
provide legal services to local school boards that defended against desegregation suits"); 
OP. GA. ATIY. GEN. No. U93-8, *1 (Sept. 20, 1993) ("This statute was passed at a time 
when the state legislature was enacting laws in an attempt to offset the impact of the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), and its progeny."). 
51. GA. CODE ANN.§ 20-2-642 provides: 
Every child between the ages of six and 19 years residing in this state who has 
not finished or graduated from high school and who is otherwise eligible and 
qualified to attend the elementary and secondary public schools of the local 
school system wherein such child resides shall, in lieu of attending the public 
schools of such local school system, be eligible to receive an education grant to 
be expended for the purpose of paying or otherwise defraying the cost of tuition 
at a nonsectarian private school located in any state of the United States or a 
public school located outside this state but within some other state of the 
United States, in the amount and manner provided by and subject to this article. 
The full statute is contained in Sections 640 to 650. See also Lowe v. State, 482 
S.E.2d 344 (Ga. 1997) (affirming denial of mandamus petition seeking to compel funding 
of act). 
52. GA. CODE ANN.§ 20-2-553(a)(5). 
53. See, e.g., Wright v. Baker County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1974); 
Graves v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1972). 
54. 1959 Ark. Acts No. 55,§§ 1, 2, codified at ARK. CODE ANN.§ 24-7-503 (1987), 
repealed, 1987 Ark. Acts No.4, § 4. 
55. 1956 Va. Laws Ch. 64, codified at VA. CODE § 22-188.3, VA. CODE § 51-
111.38:1, reprinted in 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 1098-1100 (1956). Evidently, private school 
participation stopped in 1983. Bradley v. Baliles 639 F. Supp. 680, 684 (E.D. Va. 1986), 
affd sub nom. School Bd. of the City of Richmond v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 
1987). 
56. ALA. STATS. ANN.§ 16-25-1(2) (teacher means "Any teacher, principal, super-
118 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:107 
E. "VOLUNTARY" SEGREGATION 
The legal argument that the states had retained sovereignty 
to "interpose" their authority against Supreme Court decisions 
they disagreed with was popular in the Southern states but made 
no headway in federal court.58 Another theory had slightly more 
respectability, namely, that perhaps Brown meant that enforced 
segregation was unconstitutional, but voluntary segregation was 
perfectly acceptable.59 
The Alabama Constitution contains a provision, adopted 
two years after Brown, authorizing "the parents or guardians of 
minors, who desire that such minors shall attend schools pro-
vided for their own race, to make election to that end." Needless 
to say, the governmental purpose was exclusively benign, "[t]o 
avoid confusion and disorder and to promote effective and eco-
nomical planning for education."60 Although the Supreme Court 
held a provision of this type unconstitutional in 1963,61 the 
amendment remains part of Alabama's fundamental law. 
intendent, supervisor, college professor, administrative officer, or clerk employed in any 
public school or public college within the state or employed in any private nondenomina-
tional school operated nonprofit for the education of children of school age residing 
within a district where no public school is available for the children"). The expanded 
definition was added by 1957 Ala. Acts 747, § 1 (Act No. 532). 
57. GA. CODE ANN.§ 47-3-64 ("Any teacher or school employee who is employed 
in a public school, who is covered by laws relating to a retirement fund or pension system 
maintained by any county, city, or independent school district in this state or the board of 
education thereof, and who accepts employment in a nonsectarian private school in this 
state attended by students who arc eligible for grants from the state shall continue to be 
subject to such retirement fund or pension system and shall be entitled to all of its bene-
fits, provided that he makes or causes to be made to such retirement fund or pension sys-
tem the contributions required of and for the benefit of such teacher or school employee 
had he continued employment in the public schools."). 
58. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
59. See Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) ("Nothing in the 
Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme Court takes away from the people free-
dom to choose the schools they attend. The Constitution, in other words, docs not re-
quire integration. It merely forbids discrimination. It docs not forbid such segregation as 
occurs as the result of voluntary action. It merely forbids the usc of governmental power 
to enforce segregation."). Briggs was one of the four cases consolidated in Brown itself; 
this was the decision on remand. Although quite influential in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, the so-called "Briggs dictum" was definitively rejected. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 n.11 (1973) (noting that Briggs approach was rejected in 
earlier Supreme Court cases). 
60. ALA. CONST. amend. 111. 
61. Goss v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Knoxville, 373 U.S. 683 (1963). 
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F. PUPIL ASSIGNMENT LAWS. 
The so-called "pupil assignment laws" were another method 
of frustrating integration.62 In 1962, the U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights reported that "[t)he pupil assignment acts have been 
the principal obstacle to desegregation in the South. Essentially, 
these laws authorize either the State or local authorities to assign 
pupils individually to various schools. "63 As one federal judge 
explained, in upholding the state's right to assign pupils, they 
could be used for benign purposes: 
Without purposely and intentionally discriminating between 
the races you may for any good cause or reason assign pupils 
to schools other than that nearest to them. Thus, to illustrate, 
if some pampered white boy, growing up without ever having 
been controlled or denied, enters an integrated school and by 
reason of his selfish propensities, pride or vanity or racial dis-
like creates disturbance he may be transferred to another 
school. Likewise, if an overgrown Negro boy in an integrated 
school should be by premature growth inclined to sex and 
should write verses on the blackboard of an obscene character 
designedly for the white girls to read or should make im-
proper approaches to them so as to provoke trouble in the 
school, he should be assigned to a school where the situation 
is different. 64 
Some states expressly repealed their puEil assignment stat-
utes as they began to comply with Brown; 5 Louisiana's code 
substituted a non-discrimination provision for its pupil assign-
ment statutes in 1970.66 However, Mississippi67 and Tennessee68 
62. See Gerald Nathan Daffner, Note, The Effect of Pupil Placement Laws Upon 
Southern Education, 23 ALB. L. REV. 376 (1959); Phillip J. Campanella, Note, 16 W. RES. 
L. REV. 800 (1965); Note, State Efforts to Circumvent Desegregation, Private Schools, Pu-
pil Placement and Geographic Segregation, 54 Nw. U. L. REV. 354 (1959); see also Daniel 
1. Meador, The Constitution and the Assignment of Pupils to Public Schools, 45 VA. L. 
REV. 517 (1959). 
63. U.S. COMMISSI0:--1 ON CiVIL RIGHTS, CiVIL RIGHTS U.S.A. 2 (1962). "A major 
purpose in the utilization or these pupil placement laws apparently is to secure the advan-
tage or the legal doctrine related to the requirement that a person must normally exhaust 
his administrative remedies before he goes into a federal court seeking relief against ac-
tion taken by state orricials." Race Relations Law Survey, May, 1954-May, 1957, 2 RACE 
REL. L. REP. 881,889 (1957). 
64. Borders v. Rippey, 184 F. Supp. 402,420 (N.D. Tex. 1960). 
65. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-18-301-6-18-305 (found to have been used to promote 
segregation in Norwood v. Tucker, 287 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1961)), repealed by 1989 Ark. 
Acts No. 950, § 1; FLA. STAT. AN;-.;.§ 230.232 (round to have been used to promote seg-
regation in Augustus v. Board of Public Instruction of Escambia County, Fla., 306 F.2d 
862 (5th Cir. 1962)), repealed by 1994 Fla. Laws c. 94-232, § 49. 
66. LA. REv. STAT.§ 17:111 (added by 1970 La. Acts, Ex.Sess., No. I,§§ I, 2). 
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retain pupil assignment statutes on the books. Federal courts 
have recognized that both statutes were passed to defend segre-
gation. In a case involving the Jackson public schools, the Fifth 
Circuit rejected the defense argument for dismissal on the 
ground that any segregation in the school system was voluntary. 
The premise for this theory is that any segregation in these 
school systems is purely voluntary in light of the Mississippi 
Pupil Assignment Statute, ... Mississippi Laws 1954, Chapter 
260; and that appellants cannot be heard to say to the con-
trary without at least applying for assignment to schools being 
attended by members of the white race. This is particularly so, 
the argument goes, in view of the absence of compulsory 
school attendance laws in Mississippi and the resulting neces-
sity to apply for admission and assignment annually. This 
premise is buttressed by a line of authorities that require ex-
haustion of administrative remedies, and denial of constitu-
tional ri~hts to appellants individually before relief may be 
granted. 
Given the state statutes re~uiring segregation, the court found 
this argument unpersuasive. ° Federal courts in Tennessee also 
rejected the argument. 71 
G. OTHER ASPECTS OF SCHOOL SEGREGATION 
Other state laws also contemplate segregation. The Missis-
sippi Code provides for "a 4-H Club demonstration camp for 
Negro 4-H Club members;" "this facility may be rented to other 
Negro organizations for educational and recreational use 
only."72 West Virginia law limits the number of "negro" assistant 
67. MISS. CODE ANN.§§ 37-15-13 et seq. (added by 1954 Miss. Laws Ch. 260, § 1). 
68. TENN. CODE ANN.* 49-6-3102 et seq. (added by 1957 Tenn. Pub. Acts, c. 13). 
69. Evers v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 328 F.2d 408,409 (5th Cir. 1964). 
70. /d. See also Montgomery v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 665 F. Supp. 
487, 490 & n.2 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (noting that many communities "refused to desegregate 
their schools in any meaningful way"; in Mississippi, this was initially accomplished 
through a "freedom of choice" plan in the form of the "Mississippi Pupil Assignment 
Statute"), affd, 854 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1988). 
71. See, e.g., Monroe v. Bd. of Com'rs of the City of Jackson, 391 U.S. 450, 453 
(1968) (noting that Tennessee's pupil placement act had been held to be an inadequate 
means of complying with Brown (citing Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Memphis, 
302 F.2d 818, 821 (6th Cir. 1962)); Kelly v. Bd. of Ed. of City of Nashville, 159 F. Supp. 
272,275 (M.D. Tenn. 1958) (denying motion to dismiss desegregation action "based upon 
the provisions of the Pupil Assignment Act"). 
72. MISS. CODE ANN. * 37-113-31. See generally Wade v. Miss. Co-Operative Ex-
tension, 372 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Miss), supplemented, 378 F. Supp. 1751 (N.D. Miss. 
1974), affd in part, reversed in part, 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976). 
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school superintendents to one per county, and only in counties 
where "fifty or more negro teachers are employed."73 A Mis-
souri statute regulates the supervision of persons paroled from 
the "State Training School for Negro Girls."74 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
A. JIM CROW'S BREADTH 
The continued existence of these fragments of Jim Crow re-
veals the breadth and depth of segregation. Although some of 
them betray their motives in their text, others are known to be 
part of Jim Crow only because of history provided by court deci-
sions or other sources. The facially neutral nature of these stat-
utes aimed at promoting racial discrimination raises the possibil-
ity that other facially neutral laws were passed to disadvantage 
African Americans. The surviving Jim Crow statutes are also 
remarkable for their wide scope-not only schools were segre-
gated, but also 4-H Clubs, and even prisons. 
B. WHEN DID JIM CROW END? 
Unlike some legal regimes, Jim Crow did not end with a dis-
juncture; there was no single moment of structural change, even 
as a matter of constitutional doctrine. A state adopting the Uni-
form Commercial Code, for example, must consciously and de-
liberately account for the fact that many other parts of the state's 
common law and statutory code will have to be amended, al-
tered or repealed to accommodate the new legal structure.75 The 
decades-long struggle for precision about the nature of the 
states' obligations to desegregate schools, and the decades-long 
success of the states' shifting legal response, illustrates that there 
was never a revelation explicitly declaring Jim Crow illegal in all 
its forms and advising state actors what to do about it going for-
ward. Instead, Jim Crow trailed off, fading away over a period of 
decades as the courts and Congress defined the obligations of 
the law, case by case, detail by detail. 
To be sure, Brown itself was a landmark. It has been called 
"the most important political, social and legal event in America's 
73. W. VA. CODE § 18-5-32. 
74. Mo. REV. STAT.§ 205.900(1). 
75. See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789 
(2002). 
122 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:107 
twentieth-century history."76 But as a matter of legal doctrine, its 
centrality is far more apparent in retrospect than it was at the 
time. Brown gave rise to a series of decisions striking down vari-
ous aspects of Jim Crow, but many were per curiam summary 
dispositions without opinion, and the line took a full decade to 
ripen into a general principle against racial discrimination. 77 As 
late as 1965, a unanimous Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld an 
anti-miscegenation law; it reported: "The great weight of author-
ity from both federal and state courts is that they are constitu-
tional."78 In 1971, the Supreme Court held that Jackson, Missis-
sippi could choose to close its public swimming facilities rather 
than operate them on an integrated basis.79 Even now, it is not 
clear that the Supreme Court understands the Constitution to 
require, say that "all branches and all levels of government must 
exercise their powers to eliminate the vestiges of unlawful racial 
discrimination to the maximum possible extent with the maxi-
mum possible speed."8° For example, unless they were set aside 
at the time, criminal convictions rendered by juries from which 
African Americans were unconstitutionally excluded are per-
fectly valid, and can be used to justify incarceration or enhanced 
punishment today.81 
Indeed, as Brown marked the commencement of a new ep-
och in constitutional law, it also gave rise to the classic example 
of the consequences of ambiguous exposition of law, namely the 
Supreme Court's 1955 pronouncement that desegregation was to 
be pursued "with all deliberate speed. "82 Fourteen years later, 
76. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION, 1954-1978 at 6 (1979). 
77. Goss v. Bd. of Ed. of the City of Knoxville, 373 U.S. 683,687 (1963) ("The cases 
of this Court reflect a variety of instances in which racial classifications have been held to 
be invalid"); Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 213, 247 (1991) ("Brown's narrow rationale left unresolved the constitu-
tionality of segregation in contexts less fundamental than education-that is, most areas 
of life."). In 1957, the Race Relations Law Reporter explained that "No other court deci-
sion in this century has had comparable repercussions," but "[w]hcther the principle will 
be considered broad enough to invalidate as unconstitutional any racial distinction based 
on law or supported by government authority remains to be determined." Race Relations 
Law Survey, May, 1954-May, 1957,2 RACE REL. L. REP. 881,881 (1957). 
78. Jones v. Lorenzen, 441 P.2d 986,989 (Okla. 1965). 
79. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
80. Professors Canon and Johnson offer a valuable model for understanding the 
implementation of judicial decisions. See BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, 
JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (2d ed. 1998). They note that 
"whether a higher court decision or policy goal is clearly and consistently articulated will 
have a substantial effect on lower court interpretations." /d. at 49. 
81. See Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986). 
82. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,301 (1955). 
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some jurisdictions had not begun to comply.83 Although there is 
no excuse for the delay, caused by recalcitrance rather than the 
difficulty of good faith efforts to obey the law, desegregation of 
public education was a genuinely large and complex problem. 
Yet, even with respect to far more discrete legal issues, the 
course of reform has resulted in clear rules only over long peri-
ods of time. 
Racially restrictive property covenants illustrate the am-
biguous development of legal doctrine. Perhaps the first federal 
case involving a restrictive covenant struck it down; in Gandolfo 
v. Hartman, an 1892 decision, the Circuit Court held the cove-
nant judicially unenforceable in an opinion implying that it was 
entirely invalid.84 In Corrigan v. Buckley, decided in 1926, the 
Supreme Court seemed to hold that restrictive covenants were 
enforceable in equity as mere "contracts entered into by private 
individuals."85 In 1948, in Shelley v. Kraemer,86 the Court denied 
that it reached the merits in Corrigan,87 and concluded that equi-
table enforcement of a restrictive covenant would violate equal 
protection. However, they explained, "[s]o long as the purposes 
of these agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to 
their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action 
by the State and the provisions of the [Fourteenth] Amendment 
have not been violated."88 Five years later, in Barrows v. Jack-
son, 89 the Court held unconstitutional the award of money dam-
ages for violation of a covenant; Chief Justice Vinson, Shelley's 
author, dissented. 
83. See Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 1218 (1969) (Black, 
Circuit Justice) (denying stay). 
84. Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 F. 181, 182 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892) ("Any result inhib-
ited by the constitution can no more be accomplished by contract of individual citizens 
than by legislation, and the courts should no more enforce the one than the other."). 
85. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331 (1926). 
86. 334 u.s. 1 (1948). 
87. !d. at 7 ("Whether the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
inhibits judicial enforcement by state courts of restrictive covenants based on race or 
color is a question which this Court has not heretofore been called upon to consider."). 
But see, e.g., Mays v. Burgess, 147 F.2d 869, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (after discussing circuit 
and Supreme Court affirmance in Corrigan, concluding "in view of the consistent adjudi-
cations by this court that a covenant against Negro ownership or occupation is valid and 
enforceable in equity by way of injunction, it must now be conceded to be the settled law 
in this jurisdiction."); Doherty v. Rice, 3 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Wis. 1942) (rejecting challenge 
to judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants; Corrigan "must be taken as fi-
nally settling that question"). 
88. 334 U.S. at 13. 
89. 346 u.s. 249 (1953). 
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In the 1950s and 1960s, the mainstream legal profession ap-
parently regarded racially restrictive covenants as perfectly per-
missible. In 1966, the West Publishing Compan~ published the 
volume of Modern Legal Forms covering deeds, 0 edited by Ed-
mund 0. Belsheim, a distinguished educator who received his 
legal education at Oxford and Chicago, and among other high-
lights of a long legal career held regular appointments at the law 
schools of Virginia, Tennessee, Nebraska (where he served as 
dean), and Lewis and Clark (where a chair is named in his 
honor).91 All evidence suggests that he was a respecter of consti-
tutional rights as a general matter.92 
Nevertheless, the model covenants included those designed 
to exclude nonwhites from use or occupancy of land. Deeds sec-
tion 3342 provided that "This property shall not be used or oc-
cupied by any person or persons except those of the Caucasian 
race."93 The next section prohibited sale or lease to "negroes," 
and ~rovided for "injunction, mandatory or other," and dam-
ages. 4 The text acknowledged that the covenants were unen-
forceable, but pointed out that "so long as the covenants are ef-
fectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms the provisions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment have not been violated. "95 
The ironic last chapter is that restrictive covenants had been 
illegal the whole time. In 1968, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 
the Court held that even private discrimination in the sale or 
rental of property violated 42 U.S.C. § 1982,96 and that the Con-
gress had the authority to enact the law.97 Section 1982 had been 
in effect for a century, starting life as part of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866; Gandolfo v. Hartman had been rightly decided in 1892. 
90. EDMUND 0. BELSHEIM, MODERN LEGAL FORMS (1966). 
91. See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 1994-95 DIRECTORY OF LAW 
TEACHERS 216 (1994). 
92. Dean Bclsheim represented one of the ddcndants in the murders made famous 
in Truman Capote's In Cold Blood. See Fugate v. Ronin, 91 N.W.2d 240, 241 (Ncb. 
1958). He also signed an amicus brief in support of abortion rights. See 11 WOMEN'S' 
RTS. L. REP. 213, 232 (1989). See generally Douglas K. Newell, Dedication Edmund 0. 
Belsheim: Teacher, 25 ENVTL. L. xi (1995). 
93. MODERN LEGAL FORMS, supra note 90, at88. 
94. /d. at 88-89. 
95. /d. at 88 n.77. 
96. "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and 
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and 
convey real and personal property." 
97. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (section 
1982 applies to racially discriminatory private schools). 
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Even with respect to this focused problem, the courts failed 
to offer a clear message. Five decades of Supreme Court deci-
sions left the status of restrictive covenants far murkier than 
would have been ideal. If 18 years after Shelley and 14 years af-
ter Barrows Dean Belsheim could suggest to lawyers that they 
draft racial covenants purporting to be enforceable by injunction 
and damages, even after Jones, non-lawyers could hardly be ex-
pected to intuit that they were invalid. Accordingly, as recently 
as 1998, Ohio passed a statute attempting to prevent unlawful 
restrictive covenants from being included in deeds when they are 
transferred;98 five sections of the current Code of Federal Regu-
lations are designed to ensure that veterans and others involved 
in land transactions are reminded that restrictive covenants can-
not be honored.99 
The full doctrinal implications of Brown may yet be unreal-
ized. If there is one area where the Court's contemporary juris-
prudence may remain in the middle of a false start, it is in the 
area of criminal justice, where it has not understood the Consti-
tution as requiring automatic invalidation of convictions resting 
in part on racial factors. In 1987, the Court held that substantial 
evidence of racial impact on the death penalty as a whole was le-
gally irrelevant in the absence of evidence that a particular case 
was affected by the discrimination affecting the system.100 In 
1996, the Court held that stops and searches motivated by racial 
animus did not violate the "right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures" guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 101 
The Court has recognized a theoretical right to challenge gov-
ernmental actions under the Fourteenth Amendment on the 
ground that they are racially selective, but they have set the bar 
so high 102 that it is not clear that any litigant has ever satisfied it; 
98. See 1998 Ohio Laws 83 (adding, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3953.29, prohib-
iting the inclusion of prohibited restrictive covenant). 
99. 38 C.F.R. § 36.4514(g)(2) (2003) ("The applicant recognizes that any restrictive 
covenant on the property relating to race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or 
national origin is illegal and void and any such covenant is specifically disclaimed"); 38 C.F.R. 
§ 36.4402(a)(5)(ii) (2003); 38 C.F.R. § 36.4363(d)(2) (2003); 38 C.F.R. § 36.4206(d)(2)(ii) 
(2(XJ3); 24 C.F.R. § 203.30(b) (2003). 
I 00. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
101. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). See Anthony C. Thompson, 
Stopping The Usual Suspects: Race And The Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 
(1999). 
102. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). See generally Gabriel J. Chin, 
Race, the War on Drugs and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. 
GENDER, RACE & JuST. 253, 266-67 (2002). 
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there are apparently no reported decisions dismissing a prosecu-
tion as racially selective. 
Even if none of this changes in the future, it is still the case 
that the Court's criminal justice doctrine has not been consistent 
in the post-Brown era. Once before, the Court revisited a deci-
sion failing to apply sufficient scrutiny to convictions employin& 
the "corrosive category of race is a factor in decisionmaking." 1 
In 1965, the Court upheld the right of prosecutors to challenge 
prospective jurors on the basis of race; this decision was over-
ruled after twenty years of trials and convictions by segregated 
juries. 104 If well into the 1980s, intentional racial discrimination 
was allowed in this central area of public life, it is not clear when 
in the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s, any legislature should have thought 
the time had come to bury Jim Crow. By the 1980s and beyond, 
legislators might have incorrectly but reasonably assumed that 
Jim Crow had been purged by an earlier generation. 
C. PURGING JIM CROW, ROOT AND BRANCH 
In large part because of Jim Craw's gradual rather than 
abrupt decline, even at the level of formal, written law there was 
never a systematic, sustained effort to identify the scope of racial 
discrimination and eliminate all of its manifestations. In Green v. 
County School Bd. of New Kent County, Virginia, the Court ex-
plained that school boards in charge of segregated schools, and, 
by extension, other responsible governmental officials, were re-
quired to ensure that "racial discrimination would be eliminated 
root and branch."105 With respect to the law itself, that never 
happened. 
To be sure, there have been landmark decisions and statutes 
which had a great deal of impact, including Brown, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. But the 
cases are brought by particular litigants raising specific legal 
claims. Some meritorious cases are never brought or are mis-
handled. The cases present a partial picture of the scope of dis-
crimination. Not every act of discrimination or law aimed at dis-
advantaging members of a particular race is matched by a 
judicial decision invalidating it. Decisions establishing broad le-
103. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy J., dissenting). 
104. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79 ( 1986). 
105. 391 U.S. 430,438 (1968). 
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gal principles will not necessarily be complied with by every per-
son and institution in the nation. 
With respect to restrictive covenants, for example, the Jones 
decision in 1968 hardly put African Americans on a level playing 
field. The approval given by many courts before Shelley, and the 
suggestion in Shelley and Barrows that privately enforced cove-
nants were acceptable, affected decades of transactions in a 
country where ownership of real property is a primary avenue of 
acquiring wealth. The covenants also remained in countless 
documents which would affect future transactions. These cove-
nants did not disappear simply because the Court declared them 
illegal in 1968; lawyers but especially non-lawyers reading the in 
terrorem language of Modern Legal Forms might well feel con-
strained to honor them. 106 
Legislation, no matter how broad, is restricted to a few dis-
crete areas at most. Even the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, like most legislation, was prospective, 
attempting to level the playing field with respect to transactions 
in the future, but otherwise leaving the past as it is. 107 
There have also been important reports and studies-the 
Kerner Commission report, 108 Pauli Murray's State's Laws on 
Race and Color, 109 the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights' 50 
States Report. 110 But these have been limited in time, geography 
or in other ways. 
I 06. See Richard Brooks, Covenants and Conventions (work in progress 2002), avail-
able at http://www.papcrs.ssrn.com/sol3/papcrs.cfm?abstract_id=353723 (noting continu-
ing economic effects of unenforceable restrictive covenants). Thus the decision in Mayers 
v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en bane) (per curiam), holding under the Fair 
Housing Act that deeds with restrictive covenants should not be recorded or copied 
without a disclaimer noting the invalidity of the restriction. But see Woodward v. Bowers, 
630 F. Supp. 1205 (M.D. Pa. 1986). There were also a string of actions after Shelley seek-
ing declarations that covenants were void. See, e.g., Capitol Fed. Sav & Loan, v. Smith, 
316 P.2d 252 (Colo. 1957) (granting declaration); Erickson v. Sunset Mcm'l Park Ass'n, 
108 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1961) (granting declaration); Gas! v. Gorek, 211 N.Y.S.2d 112 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (denying declaration). 
107. See, e.g., International Broth. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 355 
(1977) ("Congress in 1964 made clear that a seniority system is not unlawful because it 
honors employees' existing rights, even where the employer has engaged in pre-Act dis-
criminatory hiring or promotion practices."); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 
747, 761 (1976) (noting that a provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 insu-
lates employment seniority systems from challenge "as perpetuating the effects of dis-
crimination occurring prior to the effective date of the Act."). 
I 08. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968). 
109. PAULI MURRAY, STATE'S LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR (1950) (Davison Doug-
lased. 1997). 
110. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 50 STATES REPORT (1961) (reprinting reports 
of the state advisory committee's reports on local conditions.) 
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Conceivably, some discrete forms of discrimination-a stat-
ute segregating public transportation, say-can be effectively 
ended in isolation; once seating, service and routes are equal-
ized, it may be that the discrimination is entirely a thing of the 
past. With respect to a nation afflicted with decades of racial dis-
crimination in many different forms, it is impossible to say with 
confidence that racial discrimination has been remedied without 
understanding its full scope. Take, for example, state support of 
segre~ated private schools, which clearly violates the Constitu-
tion.1 1 Amendment 111 to the Alabama Constitution authorized 
state creation and support of private schools: 
The legislature may by law provide for or authorize the estab-
lishment and operation of schools by such persons, agencies 
or municipalities, at such places, and upon such conditions as 
it may prescribe, and for the grant or loan of public funds and 
the lease, sale or donation of real or personal property to or 
for the benefit of citizens of the state for educational purposes 
under such circumstances and upon such conditions as it shall 
prescribe. Real property owned by the state or any municipal-
ity shall not be donated for educational purposes except to 
nonprofit charitable or eleemosynary corporations or associa-
tions organized under the laws of the state. 
There are cases enjoining payments by Alabama to segre-
gated private schools. 11 In 1974, the Supreme Court upheld an 
injunction against Montgomery's support of private schools by 
allowing them access to public recreation facilities. 113 However, a 
Westlaw search reveals no cases challenging Amendment 111 it-
self, and none of the cases purport to calculate the entire amount 
used to disadvantage African Americans. Perhaps the cases re-
flect that all of the support was discovered and squelched. On 
the other hand, perhaps the cases represent the tip of the ice-
berg, and additional millions of funds or real property were put 
into the hands of private schools for purposes of segregation, but 
no one discovered it or had the wherewithal to initiate a lawsuit. 
In any event, the laws and cases span three decades, therefore 
holding out the possibility that a great deal of support was given 
over a long period of time. 
Ill. See supra note 44. 
112. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 475-78 (M.D. Ala.) (three 
judge court) (invalidating 1965-66 tuition grant laws), affd mem per curiam sub nom. 
Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 231 F. 
Supp. 743 (M.D. Ala. 1964) (three judge court) (invalidating 1957 tuition grant laws). 
113. Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974). 
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Apart from concern about the magnitude and effect of past 
transactions, there is reason to be skeptical that equal opportu-
nity can be achieved by reforming individual features of the pre-
sent system without addressing the situation as a whole. Among 
the major areas of life where systematic governmental racial dis-
crimination affected the prospects of individuals were employ-
ment, education, the criminal justice system, and housing. Be-
cause of their interdependence, even a fairly high level of non-
discrimination against a particular group with respect to three 
out of the four may well not result in equal opportunities as a 
whole for that group. An open door to the school house, fair 
treatment in the criminal justice system and access to all housing 
at market prices, for example, will not lead to fairness if there is 
substantial employment discrimination. Discrimination in educa-
tion can be debilitating even if there is non-discriminatory access 
to housing and jobs. 
A handful of Supreme Court decisions recognize the inter-
dependence of discrimination, and imply that it has constitu-
tional significance. In Gaston County, North Carolina v. United 
States, 114 a jurisdiction covered by the Voting Rights Act sought 
to reinstate its literacy test, arguing that it did not discriminate 
against prospective voters on the basis of race. The Court re-
fused, because even neutral application of the literacy test would 
perpetuate the effects of discrimination in other areas. 
It is only reasonable to infer that among black children com-
pelled to endure a segregated and inferior education, fewer 
will achieve any given degree of literacy than will their better-
educated white contemporaries .... Affording today's Negro 
youth equal educational opportunities will doubtless prepare 
them to meet, on equal terms, whatever standards of literacy 
are required when they reach voting age. It does nothing for 
their parents, however. From this record, we cannot escape 
the sad truth that throughout the years Gaston County sys-
tematically deprived its black citizens of the educational op-
portunities it granted to its white citizens. "Impartial" admini-
stration of the literacy test today would serve only to 
perpetuate these inequities in a different form. 115 
Similarly, in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 116 the Court in-
validated under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 an intel-
114. 395 U.S. 285 (1969). 
115. !d. at 295-97. 
116. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) 
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ligence test which had a disproportionate impact against African 
Americans. It explained: "If an employment practice which op-
erates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job 
performance, the practice is prohibited." 117 The Court relied in 
part on the fact that "petitioners have long received inferior 
education in segregated schools. "118 
CONCLUSION 
Race consciousness was so deeply ingrained in many seg-
ments of American society that even judges felt comfortable us-
ing racial references in court. Favorite remarks included the 
phrase "n***** in the woodpile," 119 rep,laced in a more enlight-
ened era by "negro in the woodpile." 12 Those with untenable le-
gal positions were said not even to have a "chinaman's 
chance"; 121 sneak~ litigants were sometimes compared to the 
"heathen chinee" 22 of Bret Harte's poem. 123 There is no reason 
117. /d.at431, 
118. /d. at 430. See also United States v. Texas Ed. Agency, 600 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 
1979); McNeal v. Tate County Sch. Dist., 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975). 
119. See, e.g., White v. Bd. of Adjustment of the City of Birmingham, 15 So. 2d 585, 
589 (Ala. 1943) (Brown 1., dissenting) ("There is, however, a 'n***** in the wood pile,' 
as appears from the evidence in this case-appellant has on her property a servant's 
house in which negroes, who serve people in this residence, live.") (asterisks added); 
Baker v.J.C. Watson Co., 134 P.2d 613,624 (Idaho 1943); Dillard v. State, 73 So. 799, 799 
(Miss. 1917); see also In re Agresta, 476 N.E.2d 285 (N.Y. 1985) (upholding discipline of 
judge for using phrase). 
120. See, e.g., Yellow Cab Operating Co. v. Taxicab Drivers Local Union No. 889,35 
F. Supp. 403,408 (W.O. Okla. 1940) (noting that one subject of labor dispute was "a col-
ored boy, James Criss" "while he may not be considered exactly 'the negro in the wood-
pile', is the 'fly in the ointment.'"), rev'd, 123 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1941); Johnson v. State, 
182 P.2d 777, 783 (Okla. Crim. App. 1947); see also State v. Whittaker, 94 So. 144, 145 
(La. 1922) ("The judge a quo, instead of being impressed in this case with the suggestion 
that there was 'an***** in the woods,' evidently accepted, as a fact, that there was 'a ne-
gro in the woodpile.'") (asterisks added). 
121. See, e.g., Belser v. CIR, 174 F.2d 386,390 (4th Cir. 1947) (noting that there was 
•·no likelihood (not even a modicum of a Chinaman's chance) that he would ever realize 
anything on these loans"); Commonwealth v. Savor, 119 A.2d 849, 854 (Pa. Super.) (Ross 
J., dissenting) ("From the moment the jury learned that he had a penitentiary record, 
he-guilty or innocent-didn't have a 'CHINAMAN'S CHANCE' OF ESCAPING 
CONVICTION. In other words he, in my judgment, did not have a fair trial."), affd, 120 
A.2d 444 (Pa. 1956); State v. Hensley, 1991 WL 207840, *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991), 
rev'd sub nom. State v. Hargrove, 1993 WL 300759 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Rhodes, 543 
N.W.2d 867 (1995) (counsel "decided not to pursue the suppression motion because 
there was not 'a Chinaman's chance that the statement would be suppressed.' Counsel 
was correct."). See also Chun Kock Quon v. Proctor, 92 F.2d 326, 329 (9th Cir. 1937) 
("When federal officers mete out such treatment to a man previously established to be an 
American citizen, we can well understand the bitter irony of the current phrase 'A 
Chinaman's Chance"'). 
122. See, e.g., Farm Credit Admin. v. Burleigh, 26 F. Supp. 938, 939 (D. Or. 1938) 
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to assume that a cultural feature this systematically entrenched 
will disappear on its own, particularly from written law that can 
only be changed through affirmative action. 124 
Every state has a state university with professional histori-
ans, economists, and political scientists. Every state has a judicial 
("Bret Harte's 'Heathen Chincc' could have taken a lesson'' from conduct of litigant), 
rev'd, 110 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1 940); Board of Supervisors of Monroe County v. State, 63 
Miss. 135, 1885 WL 4886, *2 (Miss. 1885) ("When asked to pay out money, they must 
answer like the 'heathen Chinee' to the drowning man, who cried to him to throw him a 
rope: 'No have got-how can do?'"); Cook v. Newby, 112 S.W. 272, 278 (Mo. 1908); 
Owens v. Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co., 175 S.E. 203,207 (N.C. 1934) (Clarkson J. dissent-
ing); Ling v. Richfield Oil Co., 16 P.2d 643, 644 (Or. I 932) ("Brct Harte's 'heathen chi-
nee' had nothing in 'ways that arc dark, and tricks that arc vain' on the devious method 
by which the contractual relations between respondent and appellant were established."); 
Pendar v. Kelley, 48 Vt. 27, 1875 WL 6622 (1875). 
123. The poem is long, but the critical stanza is: 
Which is why I remark, 
And my language is plain, 
That for ways that arc dark 
And for tricks that arc vain, 
The heathen Chince is peculiar, -
Which the same I am free to maintain. 
Bret Harte, Plain Language from Truthful James, The Overland Monthly Magazine, 
Sept., 1870, reprinted in BRET HARTE, THE HEATHEN CHINEE (1870), available at 
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/railton/roughingit/map/chiharte.html. 
124. The analysis of Justice Thomas in United States v. Fordice about the persistence 
of bad intent is particularly trenchant: 
It is safe to assume that a policy adopted during the de jure era, if it produces 
segregative effects, reflects a discriminatory intent. As long as that intent re-
mains, of course, such a policy cannot continue. And given an initially tainted 
policy, it is eminently reasonable to make the State bear the risk of nonpersua-
sion with respect to intent at some future time, both because the State has cre-
ated the dispute through its own prior unlawful conduct, see, e.g., [Keyes v. 
School Dist. No. 1 of Denver, 413 U.S. 189, 209-210 (1973),] and because dis-
criminatory intent docs lend to persist through time, see, e.g., Hazelwood 
School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309-310, n.l5 (1977). Although we 
do not formulate our standard in terms of a burden shift with respect lo intent, 
the factors we do consider-the historical background of the policy, the degree 
of its adverse impact, and the plausibility of any justification asserted in its de-
fense-arc precisely those factors that go into determining intent under Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (I 976). See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-267 (1977). Thus, if a policy 
remains in force, without adequate justification and despite tainted roots and 
segregative effect, it appears clear-clear enough to presume conclusively-that 
the State has failed to disprove discriminatory intent. 
505 U.S. 717, 746-47 (1992) (Thomas J., concurring). See also, e.g., Dcvah Pager, The 
Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM.J. Soc. 937, 958 (2003) (describing experiment test-
ing the results of job applications showing that "even whites with criminal records re-
ceived more favorable treatment than blacks without criminal records.") (emphasis in 
original); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Em-
ployable Then Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experimem on Labor Market Discrimination, 
MIT Dept. of Econ. Working Paper 03-22 (May 27, 2003) available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=422902. 
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system and most have law schools,125 so legal experts will not be 
hard to find. There are State Advisory Committees to the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights in every state in the Union. 126 The 
State Advisory Committees institutionally have decades of ex-
perience generating information about local conditions and ex-
periences and writing reports about them. 
All of these resources should be called upon to study the 
structure of Jim Crow since the Civil War. Every state should 
know whether, when and to what extent African Americans and 
members of other races were excluded from public and private 
housing, jobs, and education through the actions of the state, and 
other ways in which race discrimination shaped the laws and ac-
tivities of the government. Every state should know what was 
done about that discrimination, through litigation, voluntary 
changes in policy, or otherwise. Every state should attempt to 
identify the laws and governmental structures shaped by racial 
discrimination. Finally, every state should estimate the present 
consequences of historical discrimination. Systematic and re-
sponsible generation of facts and information would allow dis-
cussion and legislation about race and justice in ways that are 
now impossible. 
125. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 357-58 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that all but five states have public law schools). 
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1975(a); 45 C.F.R. §§ 703.1-703.10. 
